The McEliece public-key cryptosystem fails to protect any message which is sent to a recipient more than once using different random error vectors. In general, it fails to protect any messages sent to a recipient which have a known linear relation to one another. Under these conditions, which are easily detectable, the cryptosystem is subject to a devastating attack which reveals plaintext with a work factor which is 10 15 times better than the best general attack.
Introduction
The McEliece public-key cryptosystem was proposed nearly 20 years ago [14] . The system is simple to explain and is very fast in execution. It is based on an NP-hard problem in coding theory, and features the ability of a hidden error-correcting code to recover plaintext from ciphertexts which the sender intentionally garbles with random errors. Although it has received much attention from the cryptologic community, the system remains unbroken to this day.
Despite these advantages, the McEliece public-key cryptosystem it is not widely used. Perhaps this is because it has a large public key and a low information rate. But changes in technology and economics, for example the plummeting cost of storage, keep it on the list of candidates for some applications.
In this paper we analyze and exploit the failure of the McEliece public-key cryptosystem to protect plaintext when any message is sent to a recipient more than once using different random error vectors. Our message-resend attack succeeds in time, where
is a small constant, and k is the message size of the underlying code. We then generalize our attack to a related-message attack, which recovers any messages sent to a recipient when a linear relation between the messages is known, again in time. 
The McEliece Public-Key Cryptosystem
Without loss of generality we will describe the McEliece public-key cryptosystem system using the code and parameter sizes proposed originally by McEliece.
The private key consists of three matrices:
• a generator matrix for a (n = 50, k = 524, t = 50) Goppa code G F (Goppa codes are a large class of error-correcting codes which have efficient decoding algorithms); • an invertible scrambler matrix , and; S F ∈ × 2 524 524
• a permutation .
The public key is the matrix product SGP. Note that S and P disguise G as a general linear code.
Now suppose a message is to be sent. The parameters of the Goppa code (an irreducible polynomial
of degree 50 and an ordering of ) allow for the fast error correction of up to 50 errors. So a random error vector is chosen where the Hamming weight , and the cryptogram Since P is a permutation, . So decoding the Goppa code recovers mS, from which, finally, the intended recipient recovers ( )
Remarks
A great many workers, starting with Adams and Meijer [1, 2] , Hin [9] , and Jorissen [10] , have explored the relationship between the parameters of the underlying code, the security of the cryptosystem, and the data rate. For a description of this line of research see van Tilburg [17] . Optimizations have been suggested where n = 1024, k ranges from 524 to 654, and t ranges from 37 to 50. Our attack is not blunted by such adjustments.
Other workers have explored replacing the Goppa code with other types of errorcorrecting code. For example, Gabidulin et al. [5] tried using maximum-rank-distance codes. These schemes were shown to be insecure by Gibson [6, 7] . In any event, such code replacements would not prevent our attack, which does not depend on the structure of the code.
Cryptanalytic Background
McEliece stated that the most promising line of attack on his public-key cryptosystem consists of decoding an arbitrary linear code containing correctable errors. Therefore, the security of the cryptosystem seems to be based on solving the corresponding the BHDD 1 problem.
The obvious [14, 1] 
guesses to succeed.
So the work factor is w = ⋅ × α 1 37 10 16 . , whereα is the cost of inverting a 524-square matrix, roughly 524 . 3 Notice that the relatively low-weight error vector is crucial to the success of the Goppa decoding algorithm, and that it also impacts the work necessary for the cryptanalyst.
Remarks
The attack described above can be, and has been, improved slightly by taking partial information into account. See Lee and Brickell [12] , Li, Deng and Wang [13] , and van Tilburg [16] .
There was some excitement and confusion about the cryptanalysis of the McEliece public-key cryptosystem a few years ago. Korzhik and Turkin, announced that they had broken the cryptosystem. They gave a "demonstration" of their "attack" at Eurocrypt '91 [11] . However, the demonstration was only a toy: in place of the Goppa code it used a BCH code of dimension 36 in
( )
BHDD, which is known to be NP-hard. But the published description and analysis of their algorithm are not precise, and its correct functioning within the claimed time bound has never been confirmed. In summary, their attack on the McEliece public-key cryptosystem is not believed to be effective.
Failure Under Message-Resend Conditions
Suppose now that, through some accident, or as a result of action in the part of the cryptanalyst, both c mSGP e = + are sent. We call this a message-resend condition. In this case it is easy for the cryptanalyst to recover m from the system of c i . (We will examine only the case where the number of different cryptograms of the same message, which we call the resend depth, is 2. The attack is even easier at greater resend depths.)
Notice that c c (mod 2). e e 1 2 1
The cryptanalyst can easily detect a message-resend condition by observing the Hamming weight of the sum of any two cryptograms. When the underlying messages are different, the expected weight of the sum is about 512. When the underlying messages are identical, the weight of the sum cannot exceed 100. Heiman [8] showed that a message-resend condition can be detected; we will show how to exploit it.
Method of Attack
We will compute two sets from ( ) c c 
We aim to take advantage of the fact (and to quantify the claim) that
is garbled by an error vector, while How good is this strategy? Let be the probability that precisely i coordinates are simultaneously garbled by and e . Then
Pr : : 
so the cryptanalyst expects to succeed in this case with only 12 guesses, at a cost of 12α .
When L 1 96 = only about 5 guesses are required! These results are a factor of 10 better than the exhaustive attack analyzed in Section 3.
15
Note that this attack does not recover the private key. We do not claim to have broken the McEliece public-key cryptosystem. But we have shown how a cryptanalyst may recover the plaintext of a resent message with very little work.
Failure Under Related-Message Conditions
We will now generalize the message-resend attack. Suppose that there are two cryptograms 
Remark
The message-resend attack is that special case of the related-message attack where .
1 2
Conclusions
The McEliece public-key cryptosystem fails to protect any message which is sent to a recipient more than once using different random error vectors.
The McEliece public-key cryptosystem fails to protect messages sent to a recipient which are have a known linear relation to one another.
Our attack is a general attack on the class of public-key cryptosystems which use an error-correcting code and the introduction of random errors by the sender.
Our attack under these conditions is a factor of 10 better than the best attack under general conditions. 15 Users of the McEliece public-key cryptosystem, and of cryptosystems with similar structure, should guard against sending related messages. One countermeasure which comes to mind is to introduce an element of local randomness into any message before it is encrypted. But note that the obvious c m falls quickly to a synthesized related-message attack. A scheme is required which spreads randomness through the plaintext in some complicated fashion. Bellare and Rogaway's OAEP [3] et seq. are instructive. Of course, any such scheme extracts a penalty in data rate.
r SGP = ( )
Cryptosystems which are based on the use of linear codes but without per-message error vectors, for example Neiderreiter [15] , are not directly threatened by our attack. However, prudence dictates that all such systems now be reexamined for vulnerability to message-resend or related-message attack.
